In cases where the two hemispheres of the brain have been surgically separated it is thought that each isolated half of the brain 'houses' a distinct consciousness with a correspondingly distinct personality and thus a distinct self. Accepting this we might then ask, which of these is in continuity with the original self of the undivided brain? If sense can be made of this question then the natural answer is that they both are, since it seems to be absurd to assume that a new self is created ex nihilo in the surgical procedure. Similarly one can imagine an inverse of this procedure, perhaps soon to be feasible, where a sufficient bandwidth of data sharing is achieved between two separately complete brains that they 'mind-meld' into a single consciousness with a single inclusive self. Indeed you could also say that in the course of your ordinary diurnal experience as different parts of the brain are activated or become dormant, different selves 'come on-line' without you noticing any seams between them. These though experiments point to the strange logic that must obtain for the various subject-objects called selves or consciousnesses. If you make the distinction of pure awareness as against any possible content, then you the other is the virtual owner of the currently salient totality of content. With this distinction it is only the second kind of self that is subject to deconstruction due to its unwarranted appropriation of the prerogatives of the first kind. Or else, the error might go the other way around (as well?), in which the absolute Self of pure awareness is understood on the model of the virtual and content defined self of mental experience. Any idea of the unity or continuity of consciousness is exactly that, an idea, and belongs to the intrinsic structure of the mental type of self - the idea simply could not apply to the Self of pure awareness, which in fact has nothing qualitatively or existentially in common with consciousness.