Any (broadly physicalist) theory of consciousness would have to leave room for p-zombies, that is, fully functional intelligences without consciousness, or without qualia. If consciousness is not a 'thing' then in every event in which it seems to play a role the same role could be played by the functioning without consciousness, or in other words, if there is nothing requiring consciousness to necessarily be there then it is contingent and might as well not be there. Like that part in a machine which it turns out you can remove and the machine continues functioning perfectly well - often there are more than a few such parts. On the other hand if consciousness is a 'thing', then it plays a distinct role and evolution has selected for it. But then there are degrees of it, more or less, and it ought to be possible to find such disparate degrees of it that the lower ones are virtually no consciousness at all. And since we can already assume that all practical functions are reducible to their general specifications, minimal consciousness might as well be no consciousness at all. You could even imagine that the best philosophising about the 'hard problem' might be done by a mind without qualia and therefore unhindered by having to keep checking in with its experience - it being simply enough to postulate a mysterious inside to responsive and purposeful functioning, as theoretically elegant as imaginary numbers or quaternions. So, if you want to undo physicalism look to your peculiar intuition that consciousness in a necessary concomitant of any being 'like' you. This must be an unscientific insight.