If consciousness is the experience-ness of experience as distinct from its content, from that which is in some sense describable; if consciousness is the possibility of something being described (even if it is never actually described) and not the describing or the described, in other words that there is something 'like' what is going on - if it is understood in this way, then it rightly falls under witnessing, under the most general noticing of arisings, and it remains a mystery why it should be so drawn to agency and purpose, why it should give rise to the apparently mistaken notion of free-will, of identification with the agent.  Perhaps it is like this: that purposive action is the most challenging of the tasks carried out by mind or if you will, the brain, the prakriti. It is the most computationally intensive bringing to bear of diverse considerations, and so if there is a rudimentary 'what it feels like' associated with the mind or brain it is the occasion where the degrees of freedom of this proto-experience are most reduced, where 'what it feels like' is pure constraint. But the pure witnessing is the maximal degrees of freedom of any possible experience and so the sheer contrast involved gives rise to what we reflectively label identification. Pure consciousness as witnessing (or purusha) is infinite degrees of freedom, while mind in purposive action, being massively overdetermined in every one of its motions, as as close to pure constraint as possible. The witnessing asserting its ultimate or noumenal freedom in the very heart of pure constraint, is exactly the feeling of the self, with a small 's'.