There are two versions of the world. The objective one is a sort of infinite locally Cartesian space filled with material furniture including various sentient beings, including yourself and all other persons, each one having its temporal coordinates and world-line, and in every specific case resolvable into inter-related functional parts, among which are neural mechanisms forming continuously updated and much reduced models of the world governed by discoverable general laws. The other one, the subjectively based or phenomenological world consists of a sheaf of multiple hyperbolic or anamorphic sensory and ideational spaces with a distinguished singular point, so that the space becomes more and more inflated as you move attention closer to the singular point and contracted as you move it further away from it. The singular point is not in the space but attention can move infinitely close to it experiencing a corresponding infinite expansion of content. The objective world maps into the phenomenological world, but the phenomenological world does not map into the objective world, although there is a strong prejudice that insists than it nevertheless does so. The phenomenological world retains a stubborn ontological priority but in this world every matter melts into the act of being aware of it and so it contains nothing graspable in the way that the objective world is filled entirely with graspable things. The phenomenological world is marked by the absence of the the subject and our objectively biased cognitive and emotional processes seek to overcome this absence by various kinds of referential trickery and recuperations of failure. But the feeling remains that it is possible to completely resolve the phenomenological world without resorting to these functional tricks but merely by a subtle modification of the nature of attention.