Experience is performative theorising of the subject (of experience). There are obvious objectivities - which are always and essentially changing - but these can only be what they are because of non-objective absences which are taken to belong to the experiencer existing in the same reality as the experienced. For example, there is no objective desire but in the way that what is desired appears, as startlingly desirable, and in this way it is taken to belong to a desiring subject, and to prove the existence of this subject. If this subject were not at stake in this way then perhaps the whole game would cease to work, say if there were a distinct sense for desire. It is the existence of intentional modalities that are assumed to point to the being of the experiencer, rather than being seen as more general forms of objectivity. It's the nature of phenomena that is broader than we expect and there is a lot invested in treating this as somehow existentially mysterious. However phenomena could not be what they are without a non-phenomenal fringe, without such limits to phenomenality. These ought not to be seen as anything other than special kinds of objectivity. All of this is to say that the discrimination between the seer and the seen can extend without modification to all those existential parameters usually taken as the private business of the subject.