Everything said of intentionality is true of the act of interpretation, or equivalently of signification: directedness, horizon, noesis, noema, and so on, and the besetting flaws in the theory of intentionality dissolve since they arise from its deficiencies relative to a theory of interpretation - for example intersubjectivity or empty versus full intentionality. But a friction remains between the coasts of interpretation and signification, the former suggesting idealism, the latter materialism - a friction that is fertile but not 'deconstructive' - interpretation does not constitute. But this is not said in favour of a theory of interpretation, rather pointing towards the nullity of it since any lacuna or aporia in a world of interpretation is always already a matter of interpretation. Or said another way, there's no point in interpreting interpretation; if you think you have to do so you haven't yet grasped what it is that is happening, or perhaps you err in thinking that some thing is happening at all.