A theory of mind is also a theory of theories of mind and in this it can easily fall into an distorting spiral, like the endless layers of strategy in Prisoner's Dilemma. If the are no limits to what we imagine other people might do, in spite of what they say about themselves, in spite of the benign or downright compassionate image they wish to transmit, it is because we find no limits to what we might do - and why should they not have at least as much freedom to act as we do, in fact generally more so, our inhibitions being known to us and theirs not. And if we know there are no limits to what we might do it is because we can imagine our own responses to some outrageous liberty they have taken, moments when we feel justified in abandoning all limits. There are peculiar and systematic distortions in the frames we impose in considering others in order to evaluate their dispositions. We may seek to avoid the use of stereotypes but we must use them in creating these frames since in attempting to reveal the dispositions of others we use hypothetical instances where the other responds to stereotypes, stereotyped instances in other words. We judge others by the way in which they judge which we don't know but can only imagine by pitting one stereotype against another. This is the subject of much the drama both real and imaginary, both including us as actors or not, which consumes our attention. There are inherent flaws in any theory of mind which lead to the ethical turn but rather than resolving anything this only draws us in more blindly.