Just as when you push the question of consciousness hard enough in an anti-reductionist but physicalist framework you end with some variant of panpsychism, including within that even a seemingly remote variant like enactivism, so, if you start from idealism where the question is now the objective world, you end up with some sort of pan-objectivism, or pan-physicalism. Kant's thing-in-itself may be taken to an example of the latter, a term being needed to underwrite the inescapable world transcendent, or transcendental, to experience. The positions are mirror images of each other and the trouble in either case is at the interface. If what then is at stake is meaning then you need something like freedom, in the sense of a match between the degrees of freedom on either side. Consciousness may not be able to know reality but it must be able to freely comport itself in relation to it. If, say, consciousness has fewer degrees of freedom than the reality that it is faced with then you might argue that it is part of a larger system which does. In that case consciousness would be a substitutable part of that larger system, but against that one may take non-substitutability as an axiom of consciousness. The solution to this dilemma is something like Indra's Net, an idea, or model, that often arises in discussions of this question. Indra's Net however is also a model of infinity, where a subset is in perfect correspondence to the whole set. This may be taken as an inescapable argument against finitism.