Having or being a self and being conscious, or having consciousness appear to be quite different things. At least in that it is possible to be conscious in the absence of a self - although to assert this begging the question in favour of a certain kind of meaning to be given to self. There can be predictive modeling of a world and of one's interactions with that world to the point of requiring a model of the modeller, but somehow a further twist is required, a certain irreversible 'flip' for this structure to acquire the necessary descriptor as self. Presumably the details can be worked out, and in the end you get a functional prescription of being or having a self. If you ask it if it has qualia it unhesitatingly answers 'yes' - after all, every sense, both inner and outer has its own ineluctable modality. And does this 'self' feel itself to be something utterly unique, metaphysically a subject. Indeed, and with all of the attendant psychological baggage, since the twisted loop at the heart of it is paradoxical with respect to every kind of mere object. This is an account, a thought experiment, and like all thought experiments it smuggles in a background consciousness (without object relative to the thought-world) in the outermost thinker. The result, a shallowest possible self, is a singularity and inconclusive.