If experience has certain features or contents, A, then you might look for an explanation of such features or contents. But this means that they are related to another kind of feature or content, B. If the latter is taken to be unexperienced and unexperiencable (as in everyday dualism) then the explanation depends on a theory that bridges the gap between transcendent realities of the type of B and immanent realities of the type of A. Such a theory is impossible to conceive because A and B are categorically disjoint - for example, if B is material reality then B is supposed to be invariant under changes of point of view, but A is certainly not, its very existence being tied to a specific point of view. B might then be itself something belonging to experience, such as a certain belief, unexperienced but experiencable. The relationship between an experience and a belief that conditions that experience is however a doubtful matter. Is it an example of causality in direct experience or more likely a posterior fabrication of a theory of experience that exists only as a theory? You did not know that belief B was latent in experience A until the destruction of B leads to the disappearance of A.