Neither the feeling of alterity, nor the endlessly interlocking and outspreading causal connectedness of things is enough to prove the existence of a transcendent basis for experience, or in short, the objective universe. Such arguments, which seem to underlie the confidence of common-sense on this score, amount to little more than versions of the argument from design, so ably refuted by all the same suspects when it arises in another context. It is really a matter of the minimum requirements for the internal consistency of experience falling far short of such objectivity. In essence this is the same key idea as at the heart of the 'simulation hypothesis', although the latter has not at all given up on the idea of an utterly transcendent real that is out there, they have only changed its register to that of a distorted mirror image. The fact that the way of things resembles nothing that one would wish, or rather, nothing the wish for which one could acknowledge, counts for nothing, since it totally mistakes the nature of the illusion (for want of a better word). In this sense too idealism goes too far - it is still a theory with some reliance on a transcendent real, a way things really are. What is actually at stake is something far more subtle. Perhaps no more than refraining from a certain way of leaning on what is not, and cannot be, there. It's not that one needs to do away with the real - that would always be in the name of another version of the real, but rather to see that the concept has no value or consistency at all, is in truth, unthinkable.