The idea that states are independent of stages, or that qualia can be considered in abstraction from the life-historical context in which they arise is also at the core of ultilitarianism, in for example its recent reinvention as 'effective altruism'. It would seem that the ethical content of such views is smuggled in via the implicit assumption that states consist of a sort of interchangeable currency, that well-being is measurable to the degree that it not only can but must be subjected to a hedonic calculus. Ethical considerations are more properly justified by the idea of the expansion of the circle of compassionate concern, and pace Kant, it is begging the question to assume that just because such expansion is possible it should be assumed to be already pushed out to the greatest possible extent, or in other terms, that its essence can only be expressed by universal maxims. If you stick to the evidence of the expansion of compassionate concern then it is seen that this is always accompanied by ontological changes. What the world consists in is different when the scope of compassion is different. Reduction to qualia, the idea that such a reduction is meaningful, corresponds to a objectivist and atomistic ontology which possesses ethical overtones quite different from what is intended by altruists. The opposite of atomism is monism, but monism as idea is  fraught with paradox. You should go no further than the (degree or kind of) monism immediately experienced. How's that for a maxim?