It is not the witnessing so much as the being witnessed which determines not only your metaphysical and epistemological frameworks but even more severely your moral predicament. In the former cases internal imperatives point to your asymptotic identification with the witnessing, which makes these ways of thought open to the possibility of a kind of metanoia, or a good infinity, a higher freedom or liberation in very midst of ordinary experience. In the latter case the witnessing remains inescapably transcendental, but also somehow pathological. It is not just that you are seen, but that something is expected of you, but you cannot determine what that is. Reduced to its most flattened and secular form this increases the intensity of the demand to an unbearable degree. At least this seems to be what explains that oppressive perfectionism that arises, say, in utilitarianism, which otherwise might have been expected to have dissolved the force of accusation aimed at the subject by the same gesture by which it abolishes the subject. It is as if freed from God you find yourself in a Kafkaesque horror which you resolve or repress by embracing thoroughgoing consequentialism, as if you could align yourself with the witness, the Other. Can this be turned around? Can the question of who it is that is called upon, who is named, in this way be steered away from the moral and into the ontological?