What is outer unfolds according to an outer logic which regulates the manifold relations of things, and in the same way what is inner unfolds according to an inner logic which orders the plausibilities of relations. Neither of these logics predicts experience except for certain limited but important regions which underpin the larger speculative parts. As logics, however, which produce the consistency of experience, they inhere equally in wherever such logics might be deemed to reside, which cannot quite be 'the mind', since that is simply another regulative category or product of the system, or 'the world' which is likewise a product. Did anyone inquire of Kant just where it is that his categories reside, pointing out that by his own arguments 'the mind' must be ruled out as an answer? The point here, however, is a different one. It is that these are not two logics, only regional variants of a single one. The inner can't be distinguished, as it naively might seem to be, as the special abode of the subject. No, the subject is a construction too, just as much say as 'object constancy' or 'causality', and just as ungrounded. That it 'feels different' signifies nothing, since the so-called feeling is just its mode of occurrence - that's what the inner does, and certainly without entailing the incoherent notion of the little man in the Cartesian theatre. It all happens inwardly just as it happens outwardly, which is why there is no point in seeking out proofs for the transcendental - there is simply no one there to be convinced of anything such thing, but it is interesting to observe the urge to do so - there is something oddly bracing if not downright hilarious in that.