Taking the waking state, dream and deep sleep as examples of mode of consciousness, it can be defined independently of content or scope, to be the general set of constancies in the relations between self and not self, as in the degree to which they are clearly opposed to each other and to which that opposition is elaborated in temporal, spatial and ontological categories. The sense of self exists in some form in every actual mode, and is to some extent limited by that mode, but also varies over as broad a range within modes as between them. (And yes, even in deep sleep there are different forms of the almost fully merged self.) As opposed to this, the scope might be defined with specific reference to the sense of self as set of related contents variations in which correspond to variations in the core sense of self. Thus in different modes of the waking state the state of relations to other selves will be more or less included in the scope of the self. To withdraw into solitude is an attempt, often spectacularly unsuccessful, to eliminate knowledge or opinion about other selves from the self's scope. On the other hand such an elimination might come about spontaneously even in the midst of a social gathering, apart from all the obviously (self-)deceptive or performative aspects of such indifference. This is a rough diagram meant mainly to distinguish scope from mode, so as to point to the way that the former is particularly marked by a sort of radius, a dimension of size or inclusiveness. A large scope might be negatively inflected as paranoia or positively as a sort of ecological compassion or cosmic consciousness, and similarly a very narrow scope might be experienced as egoistic insensitivity or meditative one-pointedness. The curious thing is the ease with which one falls into the major error of thinking of the states of larger scope as built up from and dependent on states of smaller scope which they seem to contain. You might think of this as the psychologistic fallacy.