It ought to be seen as odd that when philosophers discuss the problem of 'other minds', or the possibility of 'zombies', they do not distinguish sharply between second-person and third-person others, between addressees and objects, between vocatives and accusatives (and beyond - because after nominative and vocative the other cases are all modifications of the third-person). A moment's reflection shows that the difference is immense. There may be no 'I' without a word being spoken, but there is surely no word spoken without it being addressed to a 'you', or better still to 'thou' - to you who are always present even when I am alone, and who is never me - the for-itself goes via you. And you and I, we, can converse about common objects, but we cannot encounter one, cannot address one, without its instantly becoming a new 'thou'. Of course there are some who insist that this means that every thou must be preceded by a be-thou-ing, accomplished by the pure 'I' - as if those people who insist on marrying an inanimate object (and there are now dozens of them) are faithful disciples of Husserl's 5th Cartesian Meditation, but who is it they are trying to fool?
(File under 'The moral obligation for threesomes'!)