A satisfying explanation of the relationship between the two phenomenological classes known as self and consciousness is hard to come by. The concept of self is related to the broad family of reflexive constructions which incorporate that term as an index of self-reference, somehow meaning the way that a system designates itself. It is the circularity that can only be spoken of in a circular way. More basically it seems to refer to a feedback mechanism, and to some emergent out of the chaotic singularity that is produced by unstable positive feedback, anything short of which would be mired by its (own) defining and definable intention. It seems however that far from meaning and intentionality being produced by such a co-inciding chaos, these elements, in the form of the pure possibility of signification, need to be fed into the system from the very start, and that this is the role played by the more mysterious term consciousness. In scientific accounts the role of consciousness is systematically purged from what is described and concealed within the latent but essential role of the observer, or the potential and act of description. One conclusion that might be drawn is that the phenomenon of self is inseparable from a theorising of self - this inseparability being also known as identification. Its nature is thus essentially process, but what makes it possible, the theorising, is precisely where consciousness is 'located', as an hypostasis of theoria.