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Sunday, 2 July 2017
The missing word was incarnation, this is not meant to describe a process with at least two distinct parts but to indicate the phenomenological nature of experience; or else it is just meant to mark a strong distinction from identification. There can be multiple identifications, you put them on and take them off several times a day, not just in watching a movie or reading a novel or dreaming, but in every real or imaginary conversation, whenever you position yourself in character space. Incarnation is an altogether more serious affair, it only happens once and you are stuck with the result, it entails an existential being-unto-death, and it marks an inescapable limit, death as your own-most possibility, absolute unsubstitutability. (Note the efforts of a certain strand of contemporary praxis to try to assimilate incarnation to identification, and note also everything in the most up-to-minute ontology that lends support to this project.) Identification is impersonal; according to it the person is a position and a position is a limited possibility, an option we can take up should we choose. The voice of reasonableness says 'I see where you're coming from.' In order to come to certainty about a matter we must pursue objectivity, which means factoring out every personal, and hence limited and biased, perspective. The ultimate position, the position in relation to truth, is no position, or the position from nowhere. Incarnation on the other hand is personal, and the personal is direct and in the flesh, it is a limit that we cannot reach by way of exhausting possibilities. The certainty of incarnation is the emptying of possibility and hence points to death. Only at the moment of death have we run out of options, it is the only place at which the certainty of the cogito truly applies. Here we might discover that there had only ever been one possibility, one perspective, and that therefore the very concepts of possibility and perspective never applied. We spent our life in the illusion that they were real, that the only meanings we could grasp were by way of counterfactuals.
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