Say that an atom of experience contains, or is made out of intentionalities. To borrow some terminology, say that there are anterior and posterior intentionalities, corresponding to noesis or subject-pole and noema or object-pole. In addition there are other kinds of intentionality which fill the function previously assigned to horizon. These allow significant moments to combine into larger unities and also express the relation of each moment to its fundamental ground. What all these kinds of intentionality have in common is that they bear some amount of (usually latent) content, and that they cannot subsist by themselves. They exist as components of the smallest possible unities or atoms of experience. Why would you want to propose such an analysis? Only in order to respond to the mysterious fact that my experience at every now is vivid and seems entirely filled up, seems complete in itself, but is immediately superceded by another quite different but equally self-contained and totalised moment, is pushed off stage as soon as it appears. Every moment by itself is so bright, so present, so entire that it seems as if it is the final culmination of Time, and yet every moment instantly passes, passes before I have been able to take full possession of it. There is the impression of having been duped by time, that it has played a mirror game with me, that when I reach out to grasp its gift it turns out to be only a reflection, but I can't stop believing in the gift, can't stop trusting time. If there are atoms of experience then oughtn't experience to be granular? The standard answer to this is to point to the cinematic image, not merely the impression of smoothness produced by the frame-rate, but also the effectiveness of good editing in concealing the jump-cuts, or revealing them, but only in a way that is subsumed in a greater unity. A deeper answer is to point to the fact that the putative observer of such granularity would be itself granular in just the same way and so can't witness granularity. Relations between atoms of experience produce the generalised experiences of time, space, embodiment and logical or semantic relatedness depending on the kinds of molecular or narrative experiences they constitute, but out of all of these the temporal relation is most fundamental. Moments succeed each other in internal time and yet join together to produce the conventional experience of thinking, feeling and willing. The question is how this synthesis is possible, how it produces the experience of an undivided subject. Two successive moments of hearing a sound, say that of a passing car, are held together in their original order as part of the retentional intentionality of a third moment, where as freshly experienced (in short-term memory) they can be reinhabited, are known to be able to be reinhabited, which means that their anterior intentionalities are identified while their posterior intentionalities inevitably diverge. What is mysterious is this peculiar identity of the anterior components - perhaps this is the famous Kantian 'transcendental unity of apperception' which here seems to be transcendental in precisely the sense that it cannot be engendered by any ways of cleverly combining posterior intentionalities.