Two things we don't commonly doubt are the matter experienced and the presence that experiences it, here. This way of describing them does not do justice to their original simplicity. We extend them into elaborate structures of world and subjectivity and then try to grasp the founding distinction using sophisticated concepts derived from these developments of it. In this way the order of things becomes confused, so that the subjective pole appears to be logically required as a consequence of the objective, and then, in a subsequent move, to perhaps not really be required at all. As an antidote to this, consider the 'I' as it was discovered in childhood prior to the assumption of a theory of being. Wasn't there a clear experience of an independent 'me' as the first reflection of the original 'I', all entirely free of paradigms of reflection, interpellation, mirror-stage or other catastrophe creations of the illusion of a subject? There was no stage or stadium, no panopticon, no model or event derived from a prior and overwhelming experience of intentional relations, of inter-subjectivity without a subject. All such theories, in their implicit forms even more so than in their explicit forms embody a profound, and perhaps original error. The kind of self produced by them is infinitely divisible and fluid, a self that can, in becoming self-conscious, 'identify as'. One is so used to this kind of self and its psychological appurtenances that no other seems possible, except as illusion. Instead the original discovery of subjective being needs to be recalled as something entirely different, as the unveiling of an event, in and out of time, more like the witness 'I', not as an abstraction but as an immense reality, one that flies in the face of all the delightful and grown-up theory that carefully dismantles the self.