The cogito, once more. 'I think therefore I am', links the thinker and being, being in being, by way of the immediately evident, of evident-ness. Of these three elements the 'I', the thinker and the being, are both presumptive, that is, they are parts of the thought about which it is presumed that their reference is clear, but without that clarity coming into question. They do not have the same degree of transparency in themselves, in their own essence, as what links them, and that, the sudden spark as it were, that bridges the two mysterious poles, is only as clear, as lit up, as its immediate occurrence; it does not extend beyond the moment of the questioning. In so far as it illuminates the two poles it only does so in that instance. That it can do even so much can only be because of a deeper ground that is not pointed to by anything in the formula, that is of the unspoken.