The simulation hypothesis utilises the idea that a good simulation of the universe can be far less complex than the presumed real universe (as thought by physics), whose complexity is such that it could not be simulated other than by a system of equal complexity. The savings are in all the things that don't actually need to be computed because they are not needed, for example, to take an extreme case, all the subatomic doings inside a piece of rock on an uninhabited planet. Implicit in this is that there is a privileged point of view, that there are things that matter to whoever set up the simulation, and chief among these the experience of conscious beings akin to the creator, for example in 'ancestral' simulations. In this way the notion of a simulation merges into that of a virtual reality, and indeed if we go along with the underlying assumption of the simulation hypothesis it would be natural that the creators would utilise it by way of the ability to participate rather than just observe. In this sense, self-conscious beings inside the simulation would be the ideal forms for the interface. How could you know then when you were being 'worn'? If we also grant that full self-consciousness is computationally expensive, then why not have only a single such character at a time, all the rest of the living beings being run as p-zombies? All of this is meant to sketch out one of many lines by which this hypothesis leads to absurd conclusions.