All computational theories of mind including their uploading, virtualising, simulating, substrate-independent corollaries inevitably come down on the anti-existential side of 'essence before existence', or of dissolving being in a solution of essences. The terms in which these physicalist realisations are framed are always via variables, that is algebraic x's where x stands for whatever it happens to point to. In other words there is no pure particular, only the convergence of a finite web of general terms, of universals. The proponents might think they are perfectly nominalist, but their nominalism is underpinned by this radical interchangeability, or formalism, of the underlying terms. Of course it is true that if challenged you could not point to a pure particular, the context of such a challenge, in words or propositionally contentful intentions, begs the question, but still something protests that this isn't enough. This is something like the forgetting of being: once it is forgotten you can't even remember what it is that has been forgotten, but only an uneasiness remains which you will not surrender.