In any discrete experience there is always whatness and thatness. If whatness is in answer to the question 'what?' then it needs to be further subdivided. There is a context-free whatness, which is essentially the same as what is meant by the term 'quale', singular of qualia, and which is indubitable, and there is also a contextualised 'what' which may be mistaken and around which all of the mechanisms of reality testing lie ready for further elaboration. Phenomenological reduction is the decoupling of these two kinds of what, the latter being embedded in, or perhaps constituting the natural attitude. None of this has anything to do with thatness, which is always indubitable. Thatness is so ubiquitous as to be easily overlooked, it hides behind whatness, it hides that it is distinct from it. Whatever you experience you posit, you mark that it is, regardless of whatever it may prove to be as an elaborated what. If it proves to be illusory that concerns what it is and not that it is, or was. This is an aspect of consciousness that can be overlooked, it confers being, you might say, on whatever comes before it, except that to speak in this way suggests that it has a kind of being before being, which is not the intended at all. It is rather the mystery concealed in Parmenides' utterance that thinking and being are the same.