Consciousness may partition into awareness, recognition and ownership, or in other terms, illumination, content and the sense of 'I', but not only do these aspects mutually imply each other, but each one can be subsumed as a special case or internal aspect of any one of the others. Of the three, however, it is only the middle one, recognition or content, that seems likely to be matched with a full description in mathematical terms, based on a suitable collection of objective conditions. But this means that the other two, the ones that seem to require metaphysics for their elucidation, could also be understood as special cases or annexes of this mathematical description. Metaphysics seems to insist when we try to understand certain aspects of consciousness, and so to give rise to more than one kind of hard problem, but it may be that this is an illusion born out of the quasi-self-reference of the contents of consciousness, together with certain structural inversions that block intuition. It could all be as simple as that. Any experience that suggests otherwise needs to be subjected to this kind of criticism - criticism whose conditions of possibility should also fall out naturally as consequence of the theory of content.