Thinking is an action of yours, so what do you think with, how do you carry through the action? To say that you think with your mind doesn't seem to say much, mind being only a name for the set of thoughts. But it seems more absurd to say that you think with your consciousness. That's odd; nobody can really say what consciousness is but it seems to be passive - you can't actually put it to work. Your mind can think as much as it likes, but whether it is conscious makes all the difference. Or someone might say that the distinction should be expressed by saying that it's whether the mind thinks it consciously. Is consciousness then adverbial, an adverbial quality of this abstraction of convenience that is the mind? It is possibly to doubt whether there is any such 'thing' as consciousness - it would be absurd to point to it and say 'that is consciousness' since what it at stake is the pointing, or an adverbial quality of the pointing. You seem to know with certainty that you are conscious, but if you examine that certainty the first part to crack is the 'are'. Is it the same to say you are consciousness as to say you are conscious? If not then how do they differ, and how do you know that they differ? Consciousness is a slippery term that can as well mean everything as something, and in this sense resembles 'being' or 'Being'. It is probably more correct to say that being resembles consciousness, it is the same kind of abstraction, only more so. This accounts for some of the doubters of consciousness who point to being and say there is no need for duplication. The slippage here arises from the fact that being carries the connotation of stuff unproblematically out there: the being of the chair, or of the rock or tree. This connotation is quite deceptive, at best circular. In other words being is a term that resolves the subject before it resolves the object - it is consciousness only more so. Heidegger followed by Sartre thought that they had overcome phenomenology in the direction of ontology, but really they were doing better phenomenology - not phenomenological ontology but ontological phenomenology - that is, being as a term to take you deeper into the mysterious workings of what for want of a better term could be called (provisionally) subject - that namelessness that subject points to.