Even if it can be meaningfully verified that the nature of consciousness is quite other than it seems why should that detract in any way from the present moment being just what it seems? This is related to the question of suffering, or of the paradigm of fall and redemption. What if it could be known at some future time that this moment's suffering was an essential precursor, or component, of a later moment's bliss, would that make this moment's suffering any the less deplorable in an absolute sense? Here it is not a matter of the suffering of one person being the precondition for the happiness of another person or persons, but of states belonging to the same being. In the former case we might have serious doubts about the possibility of any such trade-off between negative and positive states but not in the latter. To which it might be responded that two conscious states of the 'same' being separated in time are no less different metaphysically than two states in two 'distinct' beings. These questions seem to rely upon the idea of a momentary conscious state being something complete in itself. Is it just a property of such states that they seem not to be complete, or are they essentially incomplete? This is like asking whether states can ever be redeemed, which is again a question about the deep relations of conscious states to time. Does Proust offer a paradigm of such redemption of 'lost time'? Think of the sinking of a present state into the past not as the petrification of that moment and then its falling into inaccessibility but as something more akin to a cryogenic freezing. At a future moment say that the contextual problem leading to the salience of suffering in a given moment has been solved. Then, say that the original moment could be resuscitated in its living fullness and augmented with the new understanding. We know that every conscious moment is open and incomplete, so why could not the incompleteness be of just this kind. Again, this comes down to the deep temporal structure of consciousness, beyond subjectivity.