Physicalists for whom consciousness is at best an embarrassment when they want to insist that the 'hard problem' is not just bad grammar point to it by the question, 'what is it like to experience X?". It's not that they expect a reply, the question is an instance of a kind of question - for every experience X there is a what it is like to have X which cannot be folded into a detailed or functional description of experiencing X. It is an odd question, as if the essential quality of X can only be given by saying it is like Y, by giving a sort of metaphor for X expressed in exactly the same sort of terms as the original experience - by giving tasting notes for the experience, which analyse a complex into primary components, including their temporal modes, attack, finish, after-taste etc. Additionally it suggests a certain kind of social situation - tasting notes only exist when there is an attempt to make a private experience conversational. Can you imagine two wines which have exactly the same tasting notes but of which it is said that they are distinctive because the same parts are differently combined? This is fine as far as it goes, but a subjectivist or phenomenologist tries to turn this around or to take it to the next level. What is it 'like' to taste raspberry in such and such a temporal profile? What is it like once you have got to the bottom of all likenesses? The analogy suggests a purified or eidetic sensationalism, but this is surely not adequate to the sensation-conception duality in experience. The fact is that even if you take consciousness to be fundamental you are still left with a 'hard problem' within consciousness. What is it like? You are doing it all the time, even now, but no one can say in the least what it is like!