It might seem as if the three otherwise very different classes of metaphysical understanding that fall under theism, idealism and the notion that reality is a simulation, are all somehow versions of the same basic notion, something like the priority of intelligence in being. Under theism what we are capable of discerning of the ultimate reality underlying experience is the mind of God, and in particular the creative power of the logos. With idealism, the relation of our experience to the Absolute is as part to whole in thought; the two may be separated by an immense distance but the meaning and fulfillment of the part can only be in the whole. The simulation hypothesis is like Kantianism in that the ultimate reality is noumenal and unknowable in terms of the appearance, but the appearance itself, which includes all of experience, is closed upon itself, the ultimate meaning of any part being its function, not within an inaccessible whole but within its context, however widely this can be drawn. Where these three differ radically is in the meaning of the subject. With idealism the subject is necessarily related to the Absolute, and a full inclusive knowledge of ourselves is always possible. Under theism such knowledge is real but our relation to it depends on the grace or favour of God. It is possible to be drawn up into the beatific vision, but by the same token eternal banishment to a state of exile and ignorance is also possible. The capability of a soul's knowing God is present but contingent. With the simulation hypothesis we are necessarily in error and whatever we do to try to overcome this error is ultimately futile. We, as the subject, are qualitatively different from our creator(s) and the highest enlightenment we can hope for is to realise and accept our limitation. Do these differences represent a false problem? They seem to represent different grades of alienation within deep subjectivity, being different degrees to which one believes in an obscure Objectivity of the Subject, as against the categorical impossibility of any Objectivity of the Subject. But surely having once fully and deeply apperceived the non-Objectivity of the Subject the metaphysics ceases to have any significance?
Sunday, 8 October 2017
It might seem as if the three otherwise very different classes of metaphysical understanding that fall under theism, idealism and the notion that reality is a simulation, are all somehow versions of the same basic notion, something like the priority of intelligence in being. Under theism what we are capable of discerning of the ultimate reality underlying experience is the mind of God, and in particular the creative power of the logos. With idealism, the relation of our experience to the Absolute is as part to whole in thought; the two may be separated by an immense distance but the meaning and fulfillment of the part can only be in the whole. The simulation hypothesis is like Kantianism in that the ultimate reality is noumenal and unknowable in terms of the appearance, but the appearance itself, which includes all of experience, is closed upon itself, the ultimate meaning of any part being its function, not within an inaccessible whole but within its context, however widely this can be drawn. Where these three differ radically is in the meaning of the subject. With idealism the subject is necessarily related to the Absolute, and a full inclusive knowledge of ourselves is always possible. Under theism such knowledge is real but our relation to it depends on the grace or favour of God. It is possible to be drawn up into the beatific vision, but by the same token eternal banishment to a state of exile and ignorance is also possible. The capability of a soul's knowing God is present but contingent. With the simulation hypothesis we are necessarily in error and whatever we do to try to overcome this error is ultimately futile. We, as the subject, are qualitatively different from our creator(s) and the highest enlightenment we can hope for is to realise and accept our limitation. Do these differences represent a false problem? They seem to represent different grades of alienation within deep subjectivity, being different degrees to which one believes in an obscure Objectivity of the Subject, as against the categorical impossibility of any Objectivity of the Subject. But surely having once fully and deeply apperceived the non-Objectivity of the Subject the metaphysics ceases to have any significance?
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