There is experience and there is the experiencing, these are one and also two. They are distinguished, but only imperfectly. As two they are inseparable complements. Neither is sufficient. This is already a distinction which challenges any reduction of experience to phenomenality. Experience cannot be simply a dream which has descended upon a transcendent dreamer. The experiencing is not experience but there is an aspect within experience that points to it, as something like the being or event of the experience. But it doesn't stop, or even start, there, because the experiencing is originarily an experience for another subject, who is not present but not altogether absent either. The other can experience your experiencing, just as you can know the other's experiencing, without knowing the experience as such. You can know your experience as able to be experienced by the other; what they experience is not your experience but your experiencing. This is to say that the other's attention, the fact of their so experiencing, is experienced by you - as it is directed to the happening of your experience, your experiencing - without your having any access to the content of their experience, without possibility of verification. And this attention of theirs is not general, is not substitutable - everything depends on who that other is. The other's attention is not equivalent to any simulation of the other's attention. However it can be transmitted to you in a mediated way, as words in a letter, or sounds on a phone, because it is native to the symbolic. Actually, your experience as such is general; it is not particular because there is nothing to distinguish it from. It is the unique other's experience of your experiencing that makes you individual, in so far as you can be individual. When you ask yourself 'who am I', you are calling for the uniqueness you bear for others, your witness to their experiencing to be directed to your own.