The distinction between what you call the objective as against the presence you take to be subjective is a fundamental structure within experience but not itself a matter of experience. It is a kind of inference, but not one that begins with the self-evidently subjective, with the imaginary Cartesian point of origin. The world out there is the world of others, and only of yourself as one among those others. It is not that you come to know others in analogy with yourself, but that you come to know yourself as a be-ing (a process or struggle for identity) in analogy with others, who are always already established in your world, who are the reference that determines whatever meaning you can find in your own presence. Your sense of the material world is complementary to your sense of self, but your sense of self is secondary to your sense of the presence or identity of others. The existential dimension of emotions which arises from the respect in which they force awareness of your 'facticity' on you as an inevitable concomitant of their apparently only self-regarding intention (for example, 'I fear (harm)' entails that 'I am a kind of thing that can suffer (harm).') seems to prove, in what has now succeeded metaphysics, that matter prevails in the cosmos. But all that this really points to is an otherness, underlying and preceding your self, and it is more in line with the way of things known that this otherness is other selves, is in a sense social. For the existentialists the social is all too often the inauthentic, but they neglect to take account of the fact that the disquiet experienced in relation to others is identical to that experienced by way of their own putative 'facticity'. The other is the missing middle term in the syllogism of being.