The fact that the foundational principles on which mathematics is built have a purely ideal reality does not mean that they are not objective, nor especially that they can be understood perspicuously in all their consequences by the same mind that clearly posits them. This is pace arguments derived from the correspondences between mathematics and physical reality, the latter uncritically regarded as the benchmark for refractory otherness and hence true objecthood. If mathematics is a kind of empiricism the determining experiments are still required to be wholly ideal, that is, on the same footing as the original postulates, various fringe examples of hybrid proofs notwithstanding. The point of this is that just because something is mind-created or imaginary it does not follow that it can be dissolved or resolved by a gesture of the same kind as that which produced it, only somehow in the reverse direction. There may be something like the purely imaginary where to sketch something out and to erase it completely are of equal weight, but between that pole and something like mathematics where the consequences of a set of postulates can take centuries and the efforts of hundreds of minds to begin to clarify, there is a wide territory. The structures which condition the self surely belong somewhere in this interzone, but not any particular momentary instances of the self, which are readily revealed to be on the flimsy end of the spectrum.