In the expression 'a pre-reflective cogito' the word cogito does not refer merely to the 'I think' of Descartes formula, but to the entire formula, here understood so that the 'ergo' has no reference to a logical operation, because then it would be reflective, but instead summarises a necessary and immediate intuition. The intention behind this idea may well be incoherent (not taking sufficient account of language etc.), but if there is no pre-reflective cogito then the sense of existence would always be the outcome of a reflection and have only the (lesser ontological) force of logic. In fact even as a logical instance it is usually taken to summarise an argument by contradiction: 'If I am mistaken about my existence then there must be someone to be so mistaken and hence I must exist and so cannot be mistaken' or simply, 'I must exist in order to be mistaken in believing I exist.' This argument could also be seen as the assertion that the pre-reflective sense of 'existence' must actually be equivalent to a valid, or post-reflective sense of 'existence': I unthinkingly assume that I exist. Unthinking assumptions often prove to be errors when carefully examined. If that were so in this case the question would remain as to who or what was in error. But my original assumption is true if I am nothing more than precisely that one who is so in error. Therefore I exist. This argument represents the sole instance in which subjective truth must immediately convert to objective truth, whatever the sense that subjective and objective have in this context. If the case has been made for the inescapability of a pre-reflective cogito, then the sharper question arises as to why it seems so easy to escape it?