Living in the world means having an account of the world, a version of the system of the world - or does it? If we try to imagine the life of an animal we imagine the account it might give of its world, for example in Kafka's dog story, but it is quite possible that animals although possessing consciousness do not construct such accounts at all. Is what it's like to be a bat precisely the absence of the very possibility that 'what it's like' could be in question? There are matters relevant to any particular life and there are dispositions and procedures relative to those matters which determine the living, but in order to form an account there must also be objectification of those matters as contingent in some way, and hence there must also be theories which ground the possibility of variations in comportment in regard to them. The account may serve to foreclose the possibility of variations, saying in effect, 'because the world is like this we must think and act in just this way', but in doing so it is tacitly admitting that other possibilities exist. An account of the world is thus a license to speculate about the world; it may be primarily tied to action, to what can be done in that world, but this inevitably extends to questioning the nature of that world. When you find yourself in a situation you naturally seek or assume understanding of who you are and how you got there. When you cease to be in any situation, when all accounts run dry, then your life as you had known it is no more.