Every phenomenal thing arises against a horizon or background which logically precedes it. This background need not itself be phenomenal, but it defines an altered mode of phenomenality, a sort of presence so pure that it can only be regarded as absence - or in other terms which make clear the necessity for an associated act, it is the unfocalised behind the focalised. A phenomenal thing, or event, thus also implies an observer and as such requires a structure of observation. It is this pre-understood structure of the observer that corresponds to the horizon of the event, but they are not the same thing. Observers can pop in and out of existence since they are functions, not entities. That they seem to be, or to lean on, entities is only an aspect of how they function, the entities seeming to have some independent duration and the capacity to enter unchanged into various contexts or observational events. It is likely that no such entities exist anywhere and that the very idea of them is a misreading of the relativity of referencing and its dual temporality - that is, the need for the referencing act to have a different flow in time than the referenced event. If we think of an entity we think of it as being the object of some indefinite observation, and our own possible observation of that same entity as being a relationship to that other prior observation, or general observability. There are no relations of entities, there are only relations of observers. And the relations of observers are in far richer class than that formed by our imagined relations between things. The odd mirrorings that are inseparable from all perception are thus explained, as well as the nature of identity as pure selection - this one being chosen continuously out of all possibles.