So much of what is taken to be the inner life is made up of theorems about the self. These include dispositions, hopes, memories, acknowledgments given and received, none of which is meaningful without a someone which belongs to them, or whose expressions they are, a name attached to them. We may imagine these as free-floating, as when we sometimes seem to have unattributable memories, but this only points to the fact that there is no requirement for an absolute unity among the implied subjects, selves or owners of these various phenomena. Some kind of loose coherence is needed, certainly, because these facets are deeply intertwined, hopes being connected to memories and dispositions with acknowledgements for example, but the conditions are minimal, contradictions are negotiable, the only thing to avoid being implosions, and even then not in all contexts. Emotions and drives, which are so much less abstract, less superstructural, are not about the self in the same way if at all, they merely afford the raw materials for these other processes to work over. The former are almost universal, in the sense that part of their essence is that they be known to be potentially communicable and shared. A disposition is mine or yours, an emotion, even when it is me that feels it, belongs to someone in general. On the other hand where music seems to strive to communicate emotions, songs do the same with dispositions and related tropisms. Again, selves are social phenomena (the scope of the term social here being as broad as possible) and emotions and drives private ones, except that emotions are both private and general, and so are mediated by selves. The meditations on food and eating of the collective mind have much in common with this dialectic.