If he caught himself in the belief that his integrity as a self demanded fulfilment in some future experience (Erlebnis) then he would consider the case of a past self for whom the idea of his present self would have represented a fundamental reassurance - at least that much if nothing more. Such a self may or may not have existed, but it was not uniquely determined, a matter of a certain class of narratives rather than of a particular story. There is a striving for coherence of memories in memory, but it is more about the refining of an invented story than something necessarily present which has to be kept clear of accidental accretions. Indeed memory and creative imagination are well known to be not clearly distinguished. This formed a part of his cavalier attitude to the past. Yes, there is a special sort of authority that past experiences possess, as being his own experiences (Erlebnis), but they are integrated into his narrative past, and as remembered they become exemplary, mere units of experience (Erfahrung) wherein the connection to himself has been loosened. So, carrying this many-one relationship forward, his present, this apparently keen and almost uniquely determined self, could only be one of a many, a generalised past, in relation to the completed uniqueness disclosing itself in a future moment. Therefore the future cannot supply whatever fragment of being is lacking in the present. Uniqueness was perhaps too weak a word for the absolutely determining suchness of being, but nameless or under a name it is here and now in its totality with no residue, or never at all.